This paper examines the recent dramatic increase in the ratio of US non-financial debt to GNP. It concludes that it is largely the result of federal budget deficits. There does not appear to have been a major change in traditional patterns of private sector borrowing in recent years. The excessive accumulation of Federal debt probably threatens financial stability more than recent increases in private debt.
network of employees, customers, and suppliers, all of whom have made investments in anticipation of the corporation's continued viability, suffer as well. And in a world where information is far from perfect, the failure of any one company inevitably creates doubts about the solvency of others, making it harder for them to attract capital and enter into long term relationships with customers and suppliers.
In addition to these types of costs, the failure of a bank imposes direct costs on the government because of deposit insurance.
The externalities associated with financial failure make it unlikely that any laissez faire policy twards the accumulation of debt will be optimal. The private costs of taking on increased debt almost certainly do not reflect the full social costs that are imposed by the increased risk of financial failure. This creates some presumption in favor of regulatory and other microeconomic policies directed at preventing the excessive accumulation of debt, especially in sectors of the economy like banking where the externalities ar.e likely to be large. But regulation imposes costs of its own and in many cases requires information that government is unlikely to possess or be able to obtain easily. It is reasonable to ask therefore whether there are alternative macroeconomic policies which could complement microeconomic measures by altering the environment so as to make the accumulation of debt less attractive. Even if macroeconomic policy can do little to alleviate debt problems, it should surely be sensitive to their existence. This paper explores the issue of monetary and fiscal policy responses to possible debt problems.
In considering debt problems, I draw a sharp distinction between private and public sector debt. The excessive accumulation of private sector debt is a source of concern primarily because of default risks. For th foreseeable future the risk of explicit default is not a serious concern with respect to the buildup of Federal debt.
Rather, distortion in the composition of economic activity is the primary problem posed by Federal deficits.
The first part of the paper considers the relationship between monetary Dolicies and the accumulation of debt in the private sector. I begin by assessing the usefulness of credit aggregates in the setting of monetary policy. Following the decision of the Federal Reserve in 1983 to monitor domestic non-financial debt as an intermediate target, increasing attention has focused on the debt to CNP ratio as an object of policy. I review the evolution of this ratio briefly, noting its recant extreme instability. Then I argue that while it may have some value as a cyclical indicator, a number of definitional and conceptual problems preclude its usage as a gauge of risks to financial stability. More generally, it appears that monetary policy as distinct from regulatory policy is too blunt a tool to be useful in preventing debt problems. However, when debt problems do surface, the Fed has a crucial role as a "lender of last resort". distress. However, this distress is for the most part a concomitant of sharp disinflation and major changes in the sectoral composition of output. It is not primarily the result of excessive financial leverage. If policies restricting growth in non-financial debt had been in place over the last five years, they would have exacerbated the costs of disinflation.
The second part of the paper examines the relationship between fiscal policies and debt problems. I argue that rapid increases in government debt burdens such as those experienced recently in the United States have potentially serious consequences for long term economic growth because of their crowding out effects. They may also exacerbate the debt problems of the private sector by pushing real interest rates upwards and causing sectoral dislocations.
Beyond the effects of the total level of tax collections on the government deficit, the structure of taxation exerts an important impact on financial structure. Because much more interest paid is reported on tax returns and deducted than interest received is reported and taxed, the tax system works to encourage the issuance of debt. The tax incentive to issue debt for corporations at least is likely to be increased by the tax reforms currently under consideration. However, tax reforms that moved in the direction of consumption taxation could significantly reduce the tax incentive to leverage.
The paper concludes by arguing that the buildup of debt is a inicroeconomic but not a major macroeconomic problem.
Macroeconomic policies that maintain the real economy on an even keel would help to enhance financial stability. Beyond this, there is little scope for macroeconomic policy to address concerns about financial stability. Explaining Movements in the Debt-CNP Ratio Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the total debt-CNP ratio over the 1952-1985 period, along with movements in several of its components. The unprecedented movement in the total debt-GNP ratio in recent years is evident as is its remarkable stability over the 1952 -1980 period. Friedman (1982 noted the stability of the debt-GNP ratio and stressed that total debt appeared to be much more closely related to GNP than to any of its components. He went on to offer several hypotheses regarding the reasons for stability in the debt-GNP ratio. On the view that the debt-GNP ratio tends to revert towards some long run equilibrium value, the recent sharp rise in the ratio is I I I I  I I I I I I I   I I I I I I I   I 1  I I I I I   1955   1960   1965   1970   1975   1980   1985 YEAR alarming. It presages either rapid inflation tending to reduce the value of the debt relative to GNP, or a wave of defaults tending to bring the value of outstanding debt back in line with CNP. Either would be a cause for serious concern.
MONETARY POLICY, CREDIT GROWTH AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Studying the figure with the benefit of recent experience suggests an interpretation of the evolution of debt and GNP which is less alarming than Friedman's. It may be that there has been a secular, relatively steady trend towards increased private sector indebtedness, which only coincidentally was offset by a declining ratio of government debt to GNP up until 1980. On this view, there is nothing very surprising about the recent behavior of the total debt to GNP ratio. Increases in private debt have continued since 1980, but the long term decline in the Federal debt-GNP ratio has been reversed. And, there is no particular cause for concern about the solvency of the private sector.
In order to assess the validity of this alternative view, It could be argued that the conclusion that nothing unusual has happened to private sector indebtedness is misleading because one would expect, as Friedman originally argued, that increases in Federal borrowing would curtail private borrowing. On this view, the failure of private debt ratios to grow less rapidly than normal in recent years should be a source of concern. An easy way to test this idea is to see whether there historically has been a tendency for increases in government debt to be offset by reductions in private debt, once allowance is made for trends. The results suggest that there is no systematic historical tendency for increases in Federal indebtedness to be offset by reductions in private sector indebtedness. Equations estimated through 1985 suggest that after controlling for the trend,.
increases in government debt are actually associated withincreases in private debt. Even the equations estimated through 1980 do not reveal any statistically significant negative relationship between government and private debt accumulation.
Moreover, the point estimates suggest that any effect of increases in public debt on private debt is relatively modest.
Quite similar results are obtained from alternative specifications using logarithms of the debt ratio variables, and The table presents regressions of total private debt on a constant, a time trend, and lags of total government debt. Total private debt and total government debt are expressed as a percentage of GNP4 GOVDEBT(-l) and GOVDEBT(-2) are one and two period lags of total government debt. TIME is the coefficient on the time trend, and RHO is the AR(l) coefficient. Standard errors are in parentheses.
various components of the private and government debt ratios.
This evidence suggests that rather than there being a stable ratio of total debt to CNP, private sector debt has trended upwards relative to GNP largely independently of the behavior of government debt.2 Such an empirical conclusion is consistent with received economic theory. There is little reason to expect stability in the ratio of private debt to GNP or to expect that it will be systematically negatively related to increases in Federal debt. Leaving aside the foreign sector, which even today holds only a negligible fraction of total US financial liabilities, private debt is a purely inèide obligation.
Increases in debt on one part of the private sector's balance sheet are tautologically related to increases in assets on another part of the balance sheet. The level of both assets and liabilities in the economy will depend largely on the extent of intermediation in the economy, a variable about which economic theory makes few predictions.
Friedman, on the contrary, suggests a number of possible mechanisms through which the debt-GNP might tend to be stabilized relying alternatively on ultrarationality, limits on collateral, and limits on the substitutability of assets in Individual portfolios. Even on the unlikely supposition that households were ultra-rational in the sense of David and Scadding (1974) and Barro (1974) and saw through the government sector fully, it is unlikely that they would decrease their liabilities dollar for dollar when the government issued debt. Rather they would increase their asset holdings in anticipation of future tax obligations. Recall that the private sector as a whole cannot affect its wealth position by issuing less debt since private sector debt is a purely inside asset.
Nor is it likely that increases in the supply of government debt would reduce the private sector's ability to take on debt.
Government debt surely represents as good collateral as any tangible assets that it might crowd out. It is hard to see why one should expect the private sector's willingness to both hold and issue debt obligations of the non-financial sectors to be reduced when government indebtedness rises. Any set of risk preferences that asset holders might have would presumably condition their not gross, holdings of financial assets and liabilities.
A fair conclusion seems to be that what has happened to the debt-GNP ratio in recent years is not surprising given the fiscal policies followed by the Federal government. Both empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support the judgment that The most obvious problem with using debt-GNP ratios to measure financial risks is that they ignore the asset side of the balance sheet. Careful evaluations of potential debt problems such as Benjamin Friedman's contribution to this volume have long recognized the importance of simultaneously considering both sides of the balance sheet. Non-academic evaluations of financial stability have sometimes been less careful. Many types of transactions which are innocuous from the point of view of financial stability because they lead to equal increases in assets and liabilities will lead to increases in debt ratios.
For example, if a corporation issues debt in order to fund its pension obligations, the measured debt ratio will increase with little consequence for financial stability. If corporations make increased use of bank as opposed to trade credit,, their debt ratio will increase while financial stability is actually enhanced. If households borrow in order to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities, to make IRA contributions or to engage in other forms of tax-favored savings, their measured debt will increase without important consequence for financial stability. A similar pattern will be observed if, as has been the case recently, households make increased convenience use of credit cards. Without knowing why the debt to GNP ratio has moved, it is impossible to make inferences about financial stability.
While movements-in the debt-GNP ratio need not have important implications for financial stability, it is also the case that developments with important consequences for financial stability are likely to leave little trace in debt-GNP ratios.
When the assets of a sector decline in value relative to its liabilities, the risks of default are increased but the ratio of A point of major concern in many discussions of financial stability has been the sharp increase in recent years in the use of junk bonds, particularly in the context of hostile takeovers.
In assessing the risks posed by junk bond financing, two points frequently ignored in popular discussions should be recalled. As the example of the Depression makes abundantly clear, the Federal Reserve has a crucial role to play as lender of last resort. Declines in confidence can be both contagious and self-fufilling in a tightly knit financial system like that of the United States. The willingness of the Federal Reserve to act decisively to preserve confidence is crucial to the maintenance of stability. While crucial to stability, the willingness of the Federal Reserve and the government more generally to take actions to restore confidence in times of crisis no doubt encourages private sector risk taking. This is part of the case, noted in the introduction, for regulatory policies directed at financial stability. It is very unlikely however that by tracking the debt-GNP ratio or any other financial aggregate that monetary policy can do much to maintain stability.
THE FEDERAL DEFICIT PROBLEM
As Figure 1 This view of the effects of budget deficits has been challenged in recent years by Barro (1974) These estimates confirm the conventional view that deficits have their primary impact on investment, with secondary impacts on the foreign trade sector of the economy and on private savings. For this pattern of responses to fluctuations in the deficit to be observed, deficits must tend to increase real interest rates. This suggests that deficits have potentially serious consequences for economic growth. In assessing these costs, it is important to recall that deficits are not an alternative to tax increases or spending cuts. Rather they simply postpone these actions and increase the size of the adjustment that will ultimately be necessary.
Federal. Deficits and Financial Stabilit't The arguments suggesting that Federal deficits distort the composition of economic activity carry the implication that they may pose threats to financial stability. To the extent that they raise real interest rates, highly leveraged borrowers are put under increased financial pressure. The importance of this effect is difficult to gauge.
Probably more serious are the large sectoral dislocations associated with increased budget deficits. Financial health depends more on the balance sheet position of the worst off parts of the private sector than it does on the aggregate private sector balance sheet. Policies, such as those pursued recently, which lead to large shifts in the composition of output, increase the demand for some products at the expense of others. From the point of view of total demand, the shifts may be neutral but almost certainly the adverse shocks create more financial distress than the favorable ones alleviate. The financial distress of the agricultural sector of the economy, for instance, is in substantial part, the result of the crowding out of agricultural exports by the strong dollar.
If this distress and many of the problems faced by the manufacturing sector are to be ameliorated, profitability needs to be enhanced. The most direct way of assuring this is reductions in Federal deficits.
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND THE TAX STRUCTURE
The overall level of tax collections determines the level of the Federal deficit and so has ramifications for financial stability through its effects on the composition of demand.
Changes in the overall level of tax collections do not have a direct effect on the private sector's incentive to take on risky debt, but these incentives are directly affected by the structure of the tax system. The fact that total interest tax collections are negative means that the tax system is subsidizing the use of debt finance.
Whenever a transaction can be structured in a way that enables a high bracket taxpayer to make and deduct interest payments to a low or zero bracket taxpayer, the Treasury loses revenue.
Transactions which can be structured in this way are therefore subsidized. Tax arbitrae can account for the way in which many transactions are structured.
Taxes and Corvorate Debt Ecuity Decisions
An obvious example is provided by the issuance of corporate 10 debt.
For simplicity, consider initially a corporation whose future stream of profits is riskiess. It is clear in this case that in the absence of tax considerations the labelling of claims on the corporation as debt or equity will be a matter of complete indifference. But the choice of a means of finance is consequential given the tax system. When the firm relies on equity finance, its cash payments to shareholders are not deductible. On the other hand, when it relies on debt finance, interest payments to bond-holders are tax deductible. If the taxation of debt and equity income at the individual level were identical, individuals would require the same rate of return on both debt and equity securities. In this case, corporations would all rely on debt finance. However, equity is tax favored at the individual level because capital gains are taxed preferentially. This means that individuals will require a higher pre-tax rate of return on debt than on equity with the size of the differential depending on their tax bracket.
The ultimate debt equity ratio actually selected by corporations will depend on the tradeoff of the tax advantages to deducting debt at the corporate level, against the tax advantages of holding equity at the individual level, and any associated bankruptcy risks. Under current tax rules, there are few if any taxpayers for whom the tax advantage to holding equity securities exceeds the corporate advantage to being able to deduct interest payments. Debt equity ratios therefore largely result from a balancing of the tax advantages to debt finance against the associated risks. In the absence of the tax advantage to debt, corporations would find it profitable toissue less debt and take on fewer risks. I have highlighted the effects of the tax system on the choice of corporate debt equity ratios. Similar logic may be applied in other situations. Consider a stock trader considering marginning his holdings in order to purchase more stock. If the interest deductions he receives were exactly matched by interest taxes paid by the holder of his debt, the issuance of debt would have no effect on total tax collections and the tax system would provide no inducement to leverage. All the tax savings provided by the deductability of interest would be offset by the higher interest necessary to compensate debt holders for their tax burdens. On the other hand, if, as Table 3 suggests, debt issuers are typically in higher tax brackets than debt holders, the tax system does provide an incentive to leverage. The crucial point parallels the analysis of corporate debt equity ratios. The tax incentive to debt depends on the difference between the tax rates of borrowers and lenders. Because this difference is normally positive the tax system provides incentives for the private sector to take on more leverage than it otherwise would.
It is very difficult to gauge the quantitative significance of tax incentives on private sector financing decisions. One piece of evidence suggests, however, that it may not be very large. The last decade has seen reductions in tax rates on individuals, expansions in the availability of tax sheltered savings, and sharply higher interest rates, all of which should have provided significant impetus to the use of debt. But as Figure 2 illustrated, there has been little or no acceleration in the long term trend towards the increased use of debt over this period.
Tax Reform and Financial Stability
It is unlikely that the tax incentives towards the increased use of private debt will be reduced very much by the tax reform package currently working its way through the Congress. While tax reform will reduce marginal tax rates on both firms and individuals, it is unlikely to reduce the differential between the tax rate on borrowers and the tax rate on lenders by very much. Indeed, because the corporate rate will rise relative to the rates of tax on high income individual taxpayers, it is likely that the incentive for corporations to issue debt will be increased. This effect will be enhanced by increases in capital gains taxes, which will make equity securities less attractive.
Reductions in after tax corporate profits will reduce internal finftnce and so will also tend to raise reliance on debt.
While whatever tax reform bill is passed is likely to contain limits on the deductability of interest for various purposes, it is far from clear that these will in fact bind for many taxpayers. Many will find it easy to rearrange their borrowing--by increasing their home mortgage for example--and so avoid any limits contained in the law.
In order to reduce the tax incentive to use debt finance, it is necessary to reform the tax system to narrow the spread between the rate at which interest is deducted and taxed. This is likely to be very difficult within the context of an income tax system which exempts a great deal of interest income from taxation. Reforms which move in the direction of a consumption tax and disallow all interest deductions probably offer the best hope of reducing the tax incentives favoring debt finance. But such reforms are not likely to be enacted in the near future. CONCLUSIONS This analysis of debt problems and their interaction with macroeconomic policies suggests that insuring financial stability is primarily a microeconomic policy problem. There is relatively little that aggregate fiscal or monetary policies can do to insure financial stability other than trying to maintain economic stability. Nor, despite widely expressed concerns about the increases in various debt ratios, is there cause for generalized concerns about excessive leverage at present. Given the economic record of the past decade, aggregate private sector balance sheets appear surprisingly healthy. The problems that exist are largely sectoral and so call for microeconomic rather than macroeconomic remedies.
While financial stability is not a critical macroeconmic policy problem at the present time, there are important considerations suggesting that budget deficits have adverse economic effects. Budget deficits have little effect on the overall level of output in the current policy environment but distort the composition of output away from the investment and export sectors of the economy. The longer the delay until action is taken to reduce deficits, the larger will be the tax increases or spending cuts that will ultimately be required. 2. Friedman (1982) emphasizes the stability of the debt ratio over periods much longer than the one considered here. The longer term evidence is however difficult to interpret. The debt-GNP ratio did fluctuate substantially during the Depression and War years. Whether the similarity of its value in the l920s and the post-War period has structural significance or whether it is coincidental is difficult to judge.
3. Mankiw and Summers (1986) note that the standard analysis of the effects of tax induced deficits like those we are not experiencing depends on the implausible and empirically unsupported assumption that income and not consumption is the proximate determinant of the transactions demand for money. If this assumption is not maintained, it is possible for the multiplier to be negative when the money stock is held constant. 4. The relevance of the constant money assumption in the past is also highly questionable. In the pre-1970 period, monetary policy sought at least to some extent to peg interest rates.
Even when monetary policy was explicitly tied to the monetary aggregates1 the existence of fairly broad target ranges for the money stock, and adjustments for base drift allowed for changes in the money stock in response to fiscal policies. 5. While Ricardo laid out the argument he concluded that it was unlikely to be valid in practice. My views on the Ricardian equivalence proposition are laid out in detail in Summers (1985) upon which the subsequent discussion draws heavily.
6. This analysis is exactly correct for the case of a change in taxes or a permanent change in government spending. The Ricardian equivalence view does allow for the possibility that a transitory increase in government spending will affect national àavings and interest rates in the short run. 7. The point made here is developed more fully in Poterba and Summers (1986). 8. For estimates of a wider range of specifications over a slightly shorter sample period than used here with broadly similar results see . corroborating evidence from econometric model simulations is also reported. Because of the inclusion of cyclical controls, very similar results are otained using either actual or cyclically adjusted budget deficits. With the annual data used here, the inclusion of lagged deficits also has little impact on the results. 9. The major difference in the results when a correction is made for autocorrelation is that deficits are estimated to have a large impact on savings and a smaller impact on net exports. 10. The discussio,n here explicates the so called "Miller Model"
